Methods of validating an electronic signature Adult cam online no registration

Are taxpayers required to sign Forms 8878 or 8879 electronically? Taxpayers may continue to use a handwritten signature and return the form to the ERO in-person, via U. mail, private delivery, fax, e-mail, or an Internet website. The software the ERO chooses to use dictates the e-signature method used to sign the form.

Regardless of the method used, the electronic record must be tamper proof once it is e-signed.

The method further yet includes validating the electronically signed entry in a temporally delayed manner utilizing a user database.

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The taxpayer is expected to answer the questions correctly. However, taxpayers who cannot complete the identity verification check cannot use e-signature. If a taxpayer e-signs the form in the physical presence of the ERO, and the taxpayer has a multi-year business relationship with the ERO, then no further identity verification is needed.A multi-year business relationship is one in which the ERO has originated tax returns for the taxpayer for a prior tax year and has identified the taxpayer using the identity verification process.That is, the mobile platforms are not typically in constant communication, or constantly connected, with the remote communications stations such that the transmissions of data are asynchronous.Specifically, bidirectional communication between a mobile platform and a remote communication station may have significant delays, e.g., 24 hours or more, between one entity sending a message, e.g.Note: A remote transaction for e-signature purposes does not include handwritten signatures on Forms 8878 or 8879, sent to an ERO by hand delivery, U. mail, private delivery service, fax, e-mail or an Internet website. When an ERO uses tax preparation software to electronically sign Form 8878 or 8879, the software enables identity verification using knowledge based authentication questions.

If the taxpayer fails to provide the correct answers to the knowledge based authentication questions after three attempts, the ERO must get the taxpayer’s handwritten signature.Some examples of methods used to capture an e-signature include: What are the ERO’s responsibilities with regard to e-signature?If the taxpayer uses the e-signature option, the ERO must use software that includes identity verification.“A Streaming Validation Model for SOAP Digital Signature”, Wei Lu, et al., 0-7803-9037-7/05, 2005, IEEE. An electronic signature validation system, said system comprising: at least one onboard computer system (OCS), wherein the OCS is a subsystem removable from at least one control system configured as part of a mobile vehicle the OCS including: a signature generator module configured to assist in generating a digital signature for a communication being sent by the OCS to at least one central computer system (CCS) located remotely from the at least one OCS, wherein the signature generator module receives user information; a cryptographic module in communication with the signature generator module configured to: receive the user information from the signature generator module; generate a cryptographic hash; create the digital signature by signing the cryptographic hash based on the user information received from the signature generator module; and receive a dynamic certificate that is supplied to the OCS by an entity remote from the OCS that is operating the system, and that uniquely identifies the OCS that has generated the communication and the mobile vehicle that the OCS is located on; the at least one remote CCS configured to receive the signed cryptographic hash that forms the digital signature, and to receive the dynamic certificate from the at least one OCS via a wireless, asynchronous communications link, the at least one CCS comprising: a user database having stored thereon user account information for all users authorized to digitally sign messages transmitted from the at least one OCS to the at least one CCS, via the asynchronous communications link; and a signature validator module configured to check the dynamic certificate against a certificate authority to validate the dynamic certificate and to validate the digital signature against all authorized users stored in the user database. The system of claim 1, wherein the at least one OCS comprises a secure data application first portion (SDA1) module and a communications management function first portion (CMF1) module that synchronously interfaces with the SDA1. The system of claim 2, wherein the at least one CCS further comprises: a secure data application second portion (SDA2) module; a communications management function second portion (CMF2) module that synchronously interfaces with the SDA1; and wherein the signature validator module asynchronously interfaces with the SDA2. The system of claim 3, wherein the at least one CCS further comprises a user name and personal identification number (PIN) retrieval module that asynchronously interfaces with the signature validator module and is configured to retrieve user information and PINs from the user database and asynchronously transmit the user information and PINs to the signature validator module to validate the digital signature. A method for validation of a digitally signed message transmitted via an asynchronous communications link, said method comprising: in a mobile vehicle, creating an electronic message comprising a digitally signed data entry by executing a secure data application first portion (SDA1) module configured in an onboard computer system (OCS) being a removable subsystem of a control system configured as part of the mobile vehicle, the digitally signed data entry forming a digital signature on the data entry using user information and including a hardware electronic certificate supplied by a remote operator of the mobile vehicle, where the hardware certificate uniquely identifies the mobile vehicle and the OCS being operated from the control system configured as part of the mobile vehicle; a remotely located central computer system (CCS), where the electronic message is communicated from the mobile vehicle to the CCS; passing the electronic message, comprising the digitally signed data entry and hardware certificate, to a communications management function first portion (CMF1) module via a synchronous interface, the CMF1 module configured in the OCS; transmitting the electronic message, comprising the digitally signed data entry and the hardware certificate, from the CMF1 module to a communications management function second portion (CMF2) module in a time delayed manner using an asynchronous communications link, the CMF2 module configured in the CCS located remotely from the OCS; and validating the electronic message, wherein validating the electronic message comprises: validating the digitally signed data entry in a time delayed manner utilizing a user database to compare the digitally signed data entry, wherein the user database is stored in the CCS, and wherein the user database stores user account information for all users authorized to digitally sign data entries transmitted from the OCS to the CCS, the user account information comprising at least one of user information and a user personal identification number (PIN) for each authorized user of the OCS; and validating the hardware certificate against a certificate authority to validate the hardware certificate. The method of claim 5, wherein digitally signing the entry comprises entering the user account information specific to a user that is executing the SDA1 to create digital signature used to digitally sign the entry, the user account information specific to the user comprising at least one of user information specific to the user and a PIN specific to user. The method of claim 6, wherein creating the electronic message further comprises storing the entry and the user account information in an SDA1 database included in the SDA1 module. The method of claim 6, wherein validating the digitally signed entry comprises: passing the received electronic message from the CMF2 module to a secure data application second portion (SDA2) module configured in the CCS, via a synchronous interface; and passing the electronic message from the SDA2 module to a signature validator module, via a synchronous interface, to validate the digital signature, the signature validator module configured in the CCS. The method of claim 8, wherein validating the digitally signed entry comprises evoking a user specific information and PIN retrieval (USIPR) module, configured in the CCS, to access the user database to verify that the user account information is included in the digital signature. The method of claim 5, wherein creating the electronic message further comprises passing the digitally signed entry to a signature generator module and a cryptographic functions module via synchronous interfaces to convert the digitally signed entry to a formatted data string that forms the electronic message and is interpretable by the CMF1 module, the signature generator module and the cryptographic functions module configured in the OCS. The method of claim 10, wherein converting the digitallly signed entry to a formatted data string comprises encrypting the formatted data string. The method of claim 5, wherein transmitting the message from the CMF1 module to the CMF2 module in a time delayed manner, comprises transmitting the message using an encrypted asynchronous communications link between the CMF1 module and the CMF2 module. A method for temporally delayed validation of an digitally signed message transmitted from an onboard computer system (OCS) being operated on an aircraft to a remotely located central computer system (CCS) via an asynchronous communications link, said method comprising: creating an electronic message comprising digitally signed data entry, wherein the digitally signed data entry forms a digital signature on the data entry using user information and including a hardware electronic certificate supplied by a remote operator of the aircraft, wherein the hardware electronic certificate uniquely identifies both the aircraft and the OCS operated from the aircraft and the digitally signed data entry further being created by executing a secure data application first portion (SDA1) module configured in the OCS operating in the aircraft, wherein the OCS is a removable subsystem of a control system configured as part of the aircraft, and the electronic message comprising the electronically digitally signed data entry and the hardware electronic certificate being communicated from the aircraft to the remotely located CCS; passing the electronic message, comprising the digitally signed data entry and electronic certificate, to a communications management function first portion (CMF1) module via a synchronous interface, the CMF1 module configured in the OCS operating on the aircraft; transmitting the electronic message, comprising the digitally signed data entry and the hardware electronic certificate from the CMF1 module to a communications management function second portion (CMF2) module in a time delayed manner using an asynchronous communications link, the CMF2 module configured in the CCS located remotely from the aircraft; validating the electronic message, wherein validating the electronic message comprises: validating the digitally signed data entry in a time delayed manner utilizing a user database to compare the digitally signed data entry, wherein the user database is stored in the CCS, and wherein the user database stores user account information for all users authorized to digitally sign entries transmitted from the aircraft to the CCS, the user account information comprising at least one of user information and a user personal identification number (PIN) for each one of a plurality of authorized users of the OCS; and validating the electronic certificate against a certificate authority to validate the hardware electronic certificate. The method of claim 13, wherein digitally signing the digitally signed data entry comprises entering the user account information specific to a user that is executing the SDA1 to create the digital signature used to digitally sign the digitally signed entry, the user account information being specific to the user and comprising at least one of user information specific to the user and a PIN specific to the user. The method of claim 14, wherein validating the electronically signed data entry comprises: passing the received electronic message from the CMF2 module to a secure data application second portion (SDA2) module configured in the CCS, via a synchronous interface; and passing the electronic message from the SDA2 module to a signature validator module, via a synchronous interface, to validate the digital signature, the signature validator module being configured in the CCS. The method of claim 15, wherein validating the digitally signed data entry comprises evoking a user specific information and PIN retrieval (USIPR) module, hosted by the CCS, to access the user database to verify that the user account information included in the digital signature is valid. The method of claim 13, wherein creating the electronic message further comprises passing the digitally signed data entry to a signature generator module and a cryptographic functions module via synchronous interfaces to convert the digitally signed data entry to a formatted data string that forms the electronic message and is interpretable by the CMF1 module, the signature generator module and the cryptographic functions module configured in the OCS on the aircraft. The method of claim 17, wherein the hardware electronic certificate resides on the aircraft and hosts the SDA1 module, the hardware electronic certificate including a dynamic certificate that contains the identification number of the aircraft on which the OCS resides. The method of claim 17, wherein converting the digitally signed data entry to a formatted data string comprises encrypting the formatted data string. The method of claim 17, wherein converting the digitally signed data entry to a formatted data string comprises formatting the electronic message to include a personal digital certificate specific to the user using the signature generator module. The method of claim 13, wherein transmitting the message from the CMF1 module to the CMF2 module in a time delayed manner, comprises transmitting the message using an encrypted asynchronous communications link between the CMF1 module and the CMF2 module. The method of claim 13, further comprising permanently maintaining a list of transactions representing all actions against the SDA1 module an SDA1 database included in the SDA1 module. The method of claim 22, wherein the list of transactions includes a date and a time the digital signature was generated and applied to the digitally signed data entry. The method of claim 13, wherein passing the electronic message to the CMF1 module via a synchronous interface comprises checking the integrity of the electronic message using the CMF1.The invention relates generally to systems and methods for validating electronic signatures over asynchronous communication links.The user account information includes user information and/or user personal identification numbers (PINs) for each authorized user.